The glaring Arsenal tactical weakness that could see Premier League title bid unravel

Arsenal are settling quite nicely into their title challenge, even if their 2-2 draw at Stamford Bridge on Saturday was far from the perfect performance. They’re two points behind eternal rivals Tottenham Hotspur, but that slim margin – and a goal difference deficit to Manchester City, who they beat a fortnight ago – is all that stands between Mikel Arteta’s side and the top of the table. It’s a rock solid start for a side with pretentions to the crown.

Arteta’s tactical scheme is also working nicely, even if there have been some issues with Kai Havertz and his failure to nail down his role on the left side of the midfield three. But, generally, they are controlling possession as intended, creating opportunities and preventing opponents from generating too many clear-cut chances. It took a slice of luck from Mykhaylo Mudryk and William Saliba’s awkwardly outstretched arm to get into trouble against Chelsea, incidents which can be put down in part to the kind of unpreventable bad luck that every team has to handle from time to time.

But while they are doing a good job of maintaining possession and pressure on the opposition, their set-up does have a weakness that could easily be exposed by a canny manager and a team with the means to make the most of it – they are often very vulnerable to quick counters down their left flank.

This is, to a certain extent, intentional. Arteta sets Arsenal up with a variation on the tactic that Pep Guardiola used to such great effect in the second half of last season – he has one of his defenders step up into midfield in possession in order to provide an extra backwards pass for the more attacking players and to cover the parts of the field that Declan Rice can’t deal with on his own. In City’s case, the man stepping up was typically John Stones from the centre. In Arsenal’s case, the extra man comes from full-back, with Thomas Partey taking that role for the first couple of games before his injury saw the responsibility pass to Oleksandr Zinchenko.

Arsenal’s average position map shows the set-up clearly – Zinchenko is, on average, not only in midfield but also inside left-sided centre-back Gabriel Margalhães in most matches. Against City, Gabriel was the player who was, on average, furthest to the left of Arsenal’s formation, even though he has been playing in the same space that would be operated in by a typical centre-half in a flat back four.

This is, of course, deliberate. Having Zinchenko move up into midfield makes it easier to control possession and counter opposing attacks through the middle, and they do both very effectively. But it does leave a yawning space down the left for opposing teams if they win the ball from Arsenal – not that anyone has yet exploited that fact to the full.

In addition, Arsenal are heavily biased towards playing down the right side of the field, and 43% of their possession comes down that side. In attack, they have Martin Ødegaard and Bukayo Saka positioned in close proximity, two of their best outlets set up to play quick interchanges and create overlaps while overloading the opposing defence. That keeps the ball well away from the open space on their left side, but also concentrates their own players away from it. If teams can force turnovers and get quick ball out to their right, then attacking players will often have acres of space to run into.

So why hasn’t anyone exploited this yet? Partly it’s because of the way the standard modern pressing unit works – players’ defensive positions are typically related to where their team-mates and the opposition are, not to areas of the field. As Arsenal come forward and take the ball right, so the opposition follows. Arteta can leave one flank exposed knowing that most teams wouldn’t station anyone out there, as they couldn’t contribute to a team press while in that area.

But if a team did take the gamble of leaving a player out wide right – likely a team that operates a low block rather than a high pressing game – then Arsenal have a problem. Either they would be forced to push Zinchenko back into traditional left-back spaces to mark that area (which in itself could leave them light in the middle if caught in possession, with Rice asked to cover acres of space by himself) or simply take the chance that the opposition couldn’t get quick, accurate long balls into that region often enough to cause damage.

It’s likely that would be the way Arteta played it, at least until Arsenal had a comfortable lead. Any tactic whose primary weakness involves the opposition needing to play accurate long balls, especially when so many of them would also need to be cross-field, is a strong one. The passes required to unlock Arsenal’s left-side space would be long and would have to come out fast. Those are inherently high-difficulty, low-percentage plays. Play the ball too long or too central and Gabriel can come across to cut them out. Play them safe and in behind the hypothetical right-sided attacker, and they slow play down enough to allow Arsenal to get back across. It isn’t an easy opening to make the most of.

But the opening is there, and surely a side will eventually look for those quick, long balls to the right to spark fast counter-attacks. An accurate ball into that area would be a huge problem for Arsenal – Gabriel would have to come across and go one-on-one with the attacker with a swathe of space in behind, or let them run right into the most dangerous areas of the field, presumably while the attacker’s team-mates make hard-to-track late runs. A team that gets it right often enough could make hay.

Every tactic has a weakness – this one is tough to exploit repeatedly, and that will be a part of the reason that Arteta is happy to leave his side exposed in that way. Any team trying it would also have to leave a man out of the action when Arsenal have the ball as well, which makes it even easier to keep possession and even more unlikely that they turn the ball over and get exposed in the first place. But it’s bound to happen sooner or later that an opposing manager takes that chance.